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MEMO TO: ALL CONSULTANTS 
FROM: Warren Ogden 
DATE: MAY 21. 197.9 . .._ ·, ·. •·' 
RE: THE USE OF STRUKSNES POLLS TO TEST MAJORITY STATUS 
INTRODUC'l'I ON 
The basis of a union's claim to speak for the employee s 
of an employer is its allege d status as majority r ep res e ntative of 
the employees of that emp loyer. Since employee support is the 
fulc rum on wh ich all union pouer rests, it i s natural that an 
employer should wi s h to test the strength of that ful crum. Norma lly , 
the employer has only three ways of accurately determining the union's 
majority status . The first is through the conduc t of an NLRB 
sponsored and directed election. The second is what is cal led a 
Bourne interrogation of one of the employe~s sociom t r ic stars. 
'l'he third i s through the use of the so-calle d Struksnes poll. 
N.L.R.B. ELECTION 
We a re all aware of the probl ems involved in ob taining 
and controll ing the outcome of an NLRB election. The principal 
difficulty with bea ting a union in a n organizat ional c ampaign is, 
of course, the fact that the union has surp rise on its side . The 
union, in an initial organizational campaign , is customari ly th e 
party who controls the time frame , within ro ugh limi ts, duri~ g 
whi ch maiority status wi ll be t s t ed. Accordingly, it is necessa r y 
that a union obtain and retain ma jority status fo r a period fr o m 
one day to six or eight weeks. After the conduct of an NLRB e l ec -
tion, the union's majority status becomes basically irrelevan t 
for at least a per i od of one full cale ndar year. Once the b a rgaining 
relation ship has extended b eyond a full calendar year, in t heory 
the union's majority status is again subject to ques tion. In fact, 
it is extreme ly difficult to obtain the services of the NL RB to 
conduct a test of majority s tatus. In addition, a n employer may 
be fearful of placing all his chips on the outcome . In othe r words, 
the employer may wish to "shade" hi s .chances. 
INTERROGATION OF CUE GIVERS 
The second means by which an e mployer can te s t the majority 
status is proba bly as accurate as either the first or third, but 
it is subject to intense scrutiny by the Labor Board. The Board 
has customarily regarde d any atte mpt by an employ e r to inquire o f 
an employee as to union activity as a per se violation. The Board 
generally states its obj e ction to such an in t errogation on the 
grounds that there is a "natural tendency to instill in the minds 
of the employee s fear of discrimination on the basis of the 
information the employer has obtained." NLRB v. West Co as t Gasket 
Co., 205 F.2d 902,904, 332 LRRM 2343 (C.A-. ~ -195 3) -~ The Boa rd, it 
seems to me, conti n ues to adhere to its per se inte rpretcition 
de.spite its p rofes sed. willingness to consider"t.h e time , place, 
personnel involved , information sought, and ... the employer's known 
preferenc e . .. " Blue Flas h Express , I nc ., 109 NLRB 591, 34 LRRM 13 8 4 
(195 4 ). The courts-, on the othe r han d , have t ake n into account t he 
fact that modern-day emp loyees are not ne arly so.susceptible to 
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subt le threats a s we re their predeces s ors,the fact tha t the 
Supre me Court has read the first ame nd_ment rights . to · f t-~.e spe e¢h 
quite broadly, and other factors in· subjecting · Boa r ef d.et~rmina tiOns• 
concerning e mp loyee inte rrogations to strict scrut i ny. · The stan-
dard establised by the Se cond Circuit Court of App ea ls i n Bourne 
vs. NLRB, 332 F. 2d. 47, 56 LRRM 2141 (1964), has b e en widely 
adopt e d by other dircuits and is the customary t es t used by the 
court s . In c ase s o f interrogations of pee r group l ead e rs by an 
employe r in orde r to dete rmine majority sta tus, the Board will 
almost c e rtainly find the interroga tion violative but the Court 
will f i nd tha t there is no unfair l a bor practice "unless it me ets 
fairly severe standards." These include: 
"(l) The b a ckground, i.e., Is there a history of 
e mployer hostility and di s crimination? 
"(2) The nature of the information sought, e.g., 
Did the inte rrogator appe ar to be s e eking information 
on wh ich to base taking action against individual 
employees? 
"(3) The ide ntity of the questioner, i.e., How high 
was he in the company hierarchy? 
11 (4) · Place and method of · interrogation, e.g. Wa s 
employee calle d from work to th e boss 1 s office? Was 
there an atmosphere of "unnatural formality"? 
" ( 5) Truthfulness of the reply. 11 
Agreeably, if an e mploye r interrogates one of the employee cue 
give rs solely for the purpose of testing majority and not to 
discriminate aga inst individual employees, the courts would fi n d 
this p e rmissible. Of course, the Board would not.l 
POLLING OF E.MPLOYEES 
The Board ha s made great efforts to treat systematic polling 
of emp loyees as me rely a nother form of interrogation. Althoug h there 
are obvious differenc es , the Board orig ina lly took the position that 
any polling of employee s was a per se violation. Once they were 
pus h e d off of this position by the cour t s of appeals who viewed 
polling much more sympa thetically, than direct interrogation, the 
Board resorte d to its Blue Flash criteria and continued to treat 
polling as something very close to a per se violation. The Board 
ran into continued r e s istance by the courts of appeals which at 
once point came very close to distinguishing betwee n individual 
employe e inte rrogations and syste matic pol lings. · In view o f the 
continued resista nce by the appellate courts, the Board dropped 
back to a defensive posture and adopted its so-c~lled Struksnes 
1 As a practical matte r, the Courts do not go through a fu l l 
scale Bourne examina t i on in eve ry case . Where the Board has all e g e d 
and f o W1d an u na.lwf ul i nte rroga t i on, and this is ·me r e l y one s mall 
portion of the activity which the Board finds violative, and it is 
clear that even without that violation the same re s ult would obtain, 
the Courts tend to "de fer" to Board expertise. Howe ver, wh ere the 
~ 
r 
. ' 
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standards. 'I'he Board in that case stated tha.t: 
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of 
employees by an employer will be violative of 
Section 8 (a) (1) of th m et unless the following 
safeguards are observed: (1) The purpose of the 
polling. is to de termine the truth o f the union's 
cla im of majority, (2) Th i s purpose is communi-
c ate d -to the employees, (3) Assuran ces against 
r e prisal are given, (4) The employees are polled -
by secret ballot and (5) The employer has not 
engage d in unfair labor practices or otherwise 
created a coercive atmosphere. 
On the s~rface, Struksnes presents an inviting alternative . 
j ~ 
' i ~ 
' J IJ, 
for e mployers. In fact, the Board . has done everything in its -1{_-power to ma ke Struksnes the basis on which it has reenacted its 
per ~ rule . In the f irst place, the Board ·will demand of an· 1 
employer who unde rtakes to poll hi~ employees an exceedingly 
specialized knowledge of the law. An employer who undertakes 
a polling by means which fall short, on any account, of the 
Struksnes standards will have committed a per se violation. In 
the second place, eve n if the employer meets all of the standards 
set out in Struksnes , the Board h a s reserve d for itself the right 
to examine whether "the e mployer h as engaged in unfair labor 
practices· or otherwise created a coercive at;-:,,osphere" -- whatever 
the hell that means. To date, Struksnes has turned out to be a 
snare and delusion for most employers. 
Quite obviously, the Board has an institutional stake 
in finding polling of employees to be p e r se violative. This 
is so since a polling undermines the Board's principal institu-
tional peroga tive -- the authoritative determination of majority 
sta t us . While I have never s een this point argued to a court of 
appea ls as a grounds for liberalizing the Board's Struksnes 
standards or upholding an employee poll, this is, in my estimation, 
the principal problem with conducting an employee poll. The Board 
has an institutional stake in attempting to disqualify the poll 
and accordingly preven t the employe r from relying on the result s . 
interrogation alleged and found by th€:! Board is crucial to the 
Board's underlying order, as were th is is the only violation alleged 
or is the cruc ial viola tion underlying a Gissell bargaining order, 
the Courts will drag o ut Bourne and examine the .Board's determination 
critically. 
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DIS ADVANTAGES 
EVALUATION OF THE 
USE OF THE 
STRUKSNES POLL . 
The re are, as I see it, three principal disadvantages 
to using the Struksnes polls. The first is that they will be 
sub jec ted to i n t e nse Boa rd scrutiny for the reasons outlined 
above . The s e cond is that the employer, if he meets the rigid 
standards of Struksne s, substantially restricts his ability·to 
control the outcome. The third is that the employer substantially 
restricts his alternatives for future action by committing himself 
to polling of employee sentiment. 
1. In t ense Bo a rd Scrutiny. If one follows the theory that polling 
is a substitute for a Board conducte d election, albeit without the 
one year bar, it follows that the Boa rd has a substantial institu-
tional stake in preventing polling. Accordin g ly, whe n the courts 
of a pp e als c ons i s t e nt l y reve rs e d the Boa rd on polling, the Boa rd 
fell back to wha t it regarded as a standby position. It essentially 
attempted to e s tablish a standard for polling which was very n early 
consiste nt with its own election standards. It announced, in its 
own minds, that any poll which did not me e t its relatively se v e r e 
standards woul d be r egarde d as per se unl awf ul. Howeve r, · in t he 
Boa r d ' s vie w, it made an e normous concession i.n allowing even the 
pos s ib i lity t hat an employe r-conducted poll could be relied upon 
by the employer as an adequate representation of emp loyer sentiment. 2 
In practice of course, the text books are replete with hundreds 
of examples of employe r polls which did not live up to the Board's 
standa rds and accordingly were viewed by the Board as per se 
unlawful. 
The Courts are not fully satisfied with the Board's 
attitude toward Struks ne s. Many of them continue to require 
some thing more. As the 8th Circuit stated in Genera l Mercantil e 
& Ha r dware Co. v. NLRB, 80 LRRM 2622, 2623 (1972), "Although 
this Court h a s adopte d Struksnes , the decisions in this Circuit 
on interroga tion of e mployees continue to embody a n e cessity of 
ant :L ·-union an imus. 11 This addit i ona l require ment i s found in· · · 
most o f the circuit courts in one form or another. For instance , 
in NLRB v. Robe rts Br os., 36 LRRM 2424 (1955), the 9th Circuit 
found no viol a tio n whe n an e mp l oyer conducte d a s e cret poll of 
employee sentiment i mmediately afte r a privileged anti-union s p e ech 
by its manage r. The Court stated, "The per se idea announced early 
by the Board was l a t c r laid to r e st. .. by a direct ove rruling ... and 
a direct rep udiation of the doctrine that interrogation is per se 
2 It is interesting juxt apose the Board's position on 
employer polls with its position o n union-obtained authorization 
cards which it consi s t e ntly regarded as second only to the Board 
election in a ut henticity. It is obviously difficult to tell what 
an employee intends to communicate to the world by signing a union 
card. In f a ct, the emp loyee ma y intend to say some thing more than 
"th c1. nk s for t he duck d inner." But the Board presume s that the employee 
read what was on t he card and will order an employer to bargain on 
the b a sis of the cards . On the other hand, the Board will not 
presume any validity exists in an employer's poll of employees. In 
fact, it will presume tha t the employer could not rely on the outcome 
of the poll until the e mployer proves he lived up to Struksnes 
standards in conducting the poll. 
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unlawful." In other words ,· while the Courts continue to confuse 
inte rroga tion and polling and apply similar standards ., there is 
at least an argume nt based on ci r cuit decisions that "lt'is well-
settl e d that an employer interroga tion of its employees in not 
unl awf ul per se unless conducted with such anti-union animus a s to 
be coercive. "-NLRB v. Little Rock Downtowne r, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084, 
72 LRRM 2444 (8th Ci r . 19 69 ). 
Even if an employer commits himself to meet the severe 
standards of Struksnes and is willing to abide by the results of 
the poll, there is always t he possibility that the Board, in its 
fervent attempt to prevent the employer from usurping its function 
of de termining majority status, will find that the employer has 
"engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created a coercive 
atmosphere." This is an understa ndable reaction of the Board ·which, 
if aligned with pro-union employees ability to imagine, may well 
result in a Board attempt to attack the poll via other unfair 
laoor practices rather than attempting the traditional. frontal 
assult which has been so consistently successful for it. NLRB v. 
Supe r Toys, Inc., 79 LRRM 3026 (9th Cr. 1972); NLRB v. Tom · woods 
Pontia c , Inc., 77 LRRM 2968 (C.A. 5 1971); Chicago Mattress Co., 
196 NLRB 579 (1972); Ben Hur Produce, 211 NLRB 70 (1974). 
2. Controlling the Circumstances. The second principa l di sadvantage 
with th e use of the Struksnes poll is that it limits the employe rs 
abili ty to control the circumstances in which the poll is taken. 
With one exception, the employer is not limited as · to time framr . 
The Board continues to find that an employer poll conducted during 
the pendency of a c e rtification election wi ll be rega rded as per 
se unlawful on the grounds that it s e rves no useful purpose.·--
Central Me rchandis e Co., 194 NLRB 804 (1972). Although the circuit 
courts have not yet rule d on this, it is quite possible that they 
will buy the Board's logic. Accordingly, the employer is deprived 
of the opportunity of u'sing a Struksnes poll during the p endency 
of a Board certification e lection.3___ · · · 
Even given this relative ly modest limitation in terms 
of time frame, there are other significant limitations on an 
employer's ability to conduct a poll. It is obvious, that in 
order for the poll to be relied upon, an employer mus t conduct 
a poll wh i ch comes very close to me e ting Board election standards. 
The poll must b e done by secret ballot. The poll must be done 
for the purpose of testing majority status. The .employees must be 
gaurantee d freedom from punishment based on the vote. And the 
poll must be done in an atmosphere free of unfair labor practices. 
3rt has not yet been determined whether this same rule 
appli es in the pendency of a decertification election. However, 
arguably, a di ffe rent rule should apply sirice the decertification 
election should eliminate the obligation to bargain as of the time 
of filing and according ly, the poll could have no adve rse effe ct. 
Of course, if t he employer took any affirmative action to discrim-
inate against employees who vote d for continued representation, 
that would give ris e to additional charges . But if the employer 
conducts a poll during the pende ncy of a decertification election 
and wi thdraws recognition on the basis of that poll arguably no 
violation occurs. 
I 
I 
.1 ' 
---------- ------~ 
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This l a st is a significant problem if for instance the 
employer is engaged in a lengthy p e riod of "good faith" bargaining 
which has ultima t e ly culminated in convincing the employees that 
it is futile to continue to barga in through the union since the 
union c a n get no more than the company is willing to give. The 
entire p e riod of time during which the bargaining was underway 
will be s ubject t o scrut i ny by the NLRB to de termine whether any 
all e g e d unfair labor practices, eve n very technical ones, have 
somehm'1 created a coercive atmosphe re. Presumably a regional 
office w}1ich is willing to block an NLRB election on the basis of 
a "technical" violation is also willing to find that a similar 
viol a tion created an atmosphere so coe rcive that the employers 
poll could not be relied upon.4 
In the ory, an employer is not preve nte d from doing 
exte nsive stage s etting f or the conduct of the p o ll. However, 
it is reasonabl e to a ssume that the Boa~d will u s e every method 
at its disposa l t o de t e r mine that the stage sett i ng was somehow 
violative of the Act. As indicate d above, the Board has a 
substa ntial ins titutional stake in so doing. Accordingly, an 
employer must be ve r y circumspect in preparing the employees for 
the coming poll. I r onically, a union has to meet a heavier burden 
of proof to cha lle n ge an employ e r po l l than it does to overturn 
a Board e lectio n. This i s so b ecau s e the Boa r d h a s consistently 
held that one of its e lection s may b E set a s ide b e caus e of employer 
mis-conduct which does not amount to an unfair labor practice. 
In other words, while a un i on may not have to all e ge, and the 
Board p rove , that a particular pie ce of employer propaganda amounted 
to an unfair l a bor practice in order to set aside a Board election; 
in order to set aside an employer poll, the union must contend and 
the Bo a rd prove that the employer's activity amounted to an unfair 
labor pra ctice. Accordingly, it is reasonable to anticipate that 
the Board will give every leniency t o a union claim that the 
employer committe d some extra neous unfair labor practice wh ich 
tainted the atmosphere in which the poll was tak e n. The Board 
could be expe c te d to ben d over backwards to find a ULP charge has 
merit when the ef f ect o f such a finding wo u ld be to prevent the 
employ e r from r ely ing on t h e poll. 
3. Re duction o f Altern a tives. The third principal problem with 
the u se of a Struks n e s poll is ~hat the employ e r may limit his 
alte rnatives. In s hort, the employ e r, whether require d to by the 
4 Pete and Fred, you may see in the above the basis of attacking 
the Bo a rd's blocking charge policy in an unfair labor practice 
proce e ding despite t he Bo a rd's consi s tent refusal to a llow an 
employe r to litigate a r e presentation matter in an unfair labor 
practice proc e e ding. If the Board blocks your decertification 
election, you conduct a poll. Presuming the poll lives up to 
Strul~s n e s s tanda rds, the union must allege that the ULP that 
"bloc ked " the c harge created a n atmos phere which was so coercive 
tha t the poll could not be relied upon. The employer then gets 
hi s dQy i n cour t on the issue of whether there is connection 
b e t we e n the ULP and the election. 
i : 
I ; 
11 
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Act or not, will be obliged to live with the results of the poll. 
True, if the poll does not show that the union has lost its majority 
status, the employer is under no obligation to divulge the results. 
T~ue, even if the employer loses, he obtains some estimate of 
the intens ity of the union support which may bear on such matters 
as the likelihood of a strike. But basically, a n e mployer who 
conducts a poll and d e termines that the employees do in fact 
support the union must live with the results. 
Quite obviously, an employer who polls the employees 
and determines that the employees support the union has no basis 
for refusing to bargain. While the poll may give him needed 
informat ion as to what particular groups of employees constitute 
the bulk of union strength, the employer is still left with a 
union ma jority and must limit his future beha vior on the basis 
of that unders tanding. Further, if the resul ts of the poll do 
become public, an employer will be bound to live by them since 
the union could use the results of the poll to its own advantage. 
That is a serious disadvantage, but thos e are the risks that the 
employer assumes. 
ADVAN'l'AGES 
There are, in my vie w, four principal advantages in 
using a Struksnes poll. The first is, obvious ly, that the employer 
can rely on the r e sults of the poll and refuse to bargain. The 
second is that the employer has exclusive control over major, 
and perhaps determinative, aspects of the polling. Third, the 
poll is not nearly so susce ptible to second guessing on the 
basis of propaganda , Milchelm violations, and other peripherals 
as are regular board elections. Finally, when the employer 
conduc t s the poll he, in effect, commits a deliberate, intentional 
act which will be alleged to be an · unfair labor practice and 
accordingly is in a much better position to defend his action. 
1. Wi thdrawal of Recognition. The fir s t advantage of this poll 
is o b vious and o verriding. The e mployer may rely on the results 
of the po ll as the basis on which to refuse t o bargain. If the 
pol l turns o u t as the employer hope s it will, he may, as of the 
moment of c e rti f icat ion of r esults, r e fuse to bargain . In othe r 
words, the r esults of the poll can have the absolute effect of 
blocking any further negotiation with the union. 
As a spin off of this, if the employer handles himself 
correctly in relation to the employees, the results of that poll 
are effectively unchalle gnable by the union. Even if the un ion 
r esorts to th8 NLRB, as it almost surely must, the employer may 
take its case to the employees immediately after the results are 
made known. The emp loyer t e lls the employees that it conducted 
a fair, free poll. They were against the union. It intends to 
honor the employe e s wishes. But the union wants to prevent them 
from h a ving a say. If h a ndled successfully, e ven if the employe r 
is fo und to h a ve committed one or more unfair labor practices in 
the conduct of the poll, the employer may ve ry well solidify 
i 
I 
.l 
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support on his side to such a point that no strike will be 
possible and accordingly the union's position . substantially 
weakened. 
2. The Emp loyer Determines When, Where & How The Poll is Conducted. 
With the exception of a relative ly brie f period during the pendency 
of a certification petition, the employer is basically free to 
establish the time a t which the poll will be take n. This it seems 
to me, is a matter of very great importance, and may well justify 
taking the chance which a Struksnes poll involves. 
The principal advantage that a union has in establishing 
itself in an employer's business is surprise. Ove r the long 
continwn of years involved .in an employer/employee relations hip, 
it is necessary that the union obtain and retain a majority status 
only from date of demand to the date an NLRB election can be finally·,:· 
resolved. Once that cri tical period has past, the majority status· · 
of the union becomes largely irrelevant. In addition, the union 
obtains a powe rful ally in the National Labor Rela t ions Board which, 
as noted above, has a stake in assuring that no further questions 
concerning majority status are raised. 
In theory, the employer may use the methods involve d 
with an RM election or the employees may use the technique of 
an RD election in order to test majority status if the petition 
is filed in "window" of a contract, or after a contract has lapsed 
and before another is signed. However, the difficulties involved 
with obtaining decertification elections are enormous since they 
are subject to the Board's blocking charge procedure. Further 
the use of the decertification petitions involves an advance 
tip off to the union that their majority status is again to be 
tested. This gives them the opportunity to begin to campaign 
again to defend themselves in a democratic election. Given the 
fact that the union has at its disposal a ready-made technique 
for delaying the . election for a subtantial period of time, the 
union will a lmost s urely obtain a delay by filing ULP charges, 
or refusing to conduct an ele ction. Consequently , a decertifica-
tion election has much less chance of turning out in the e mp loyer 's 
favo r than does a poll. 
It should b~ obvious that where an em?loyer attempts 
to attack the union's majority status, the union • will use every 
weapon at its dispos al to delay the election. Afte r all, the 
pos s ibility of losing an election is an enormous threat. This 
is particularly true when the unit involved is one of considerable 
size. Further, with many industries, the union has an exceptionally 
large stake in a particular unit because it may represent a toe 
hold in that industry. In other words, for practical purposes, 
the union will be under considerable pressure to use whatever 
methods it has at its disposal to delay testing its majority 
status and will use the time accorded it . to regroup. 
l 
.1 
• 1 
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3. The Union Mu s t Pl e ad and Prove an Unfair La bor Practice. 
The third major a dvantage, b e sides surprise, is that an employer 
Struks nes poll is not subj ec t to the same critical examination 
that the conduct of a Board certification or de certification 
election is. The results of a Board election can be over turned 
o n the basis of any nwnber of actions or statements which do not 
constitute direct violations of the National Labor Relations Act. 
For instance, electioneering at or around the polling place may 
be a violation of the Board's Milchelm rules, but is not a 
violation of Se ction 8(a) (1) of the Act. Additionally, all of 
the employer or union written statements are subject to scrutiny 
by the Board to determine the truthfulness thereof. While the 
employer or the union may not have committed an unfair labor 
practice in distributing the literature, the Board will essentially 
determine whethe r the material in the campaign propoganda is 
factually corre ct and will over turn the results of the election 
if the literature was untrue. With a poll, none of these problems 
exist. In order to overturn the results of a poll, it is necessary 
for the union to allege and the Board to prove that the employer 
violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. 
4. An Emplo y e r h a s Advance Knowle dge That The Union Will Citiciz e 
The Poll. A fo urth ma j or advantage of cond ucting a Struk sn e s 
poll i s that the employ er is in the position of effectively con-
trolling all of the "proof" used to determine that his poll was 
inade quate or that other activities on his behalf created a 
coercive atmo sphe re. It is true that employees may not "remember" 
that all of the gua rantees laid out in Struksnes were g i ven to 
them. But the employer, knowing that he will conduct the poll and 
knowing with considerable assurance that the Board will test that 
poll in a ULP proce eding may take steps to assure himself that 
he has proof that the guarantees were given. Therefore, the 
employer may l eave the union and the Board with relatively little 
ammunition with which to prove the alleged violations of Section 
8 (a) (1) or (5) of the Act. 
All of the above may appear to be predicated on the 
assumption that the Board will attempt to challenge the poll 
in an unfair labor practice proceeding. However, given the 
validity of my assumption that the Board has an institutional 
stake in pre ve nting such polls from taking place, I think its 
fair to assume t hat the Board will, in fact, challenge the poll 
even if it is necessary to solicit a charge to do so. If the 
union i s seriously interested in maintaining its bargaining 
relationship, it surely will rely o.n the Board and do everything 
it can to h e lp the Board prove its case. 
PRACTICAL REQUIREMENTS 
It is surprising that the cases show so little ingenuity 
in the use of pol l s by e mployers. However, some employ e rs have 
mad e use of th e poll with devasta ting effect. For ins tance , in 
th e H.P. Wass o n Company t h e employer polled a relatively small 
51-pe rson unit. The employer did so by employing a private research 
tn:t:t !IP ?rt ' - 11• ,_ • r:m • 
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compa ny to go to the employees homes at night. The members of 
the survey crew had been thoroughly advised as to exactly what 
to say. In each case they were acocmpanied by a court reporter - -~ 
who copied down a verbatim record of what was said so that . , /y (( 
there could be no mistaking the fact that the appropriate cautions 
were give n. The e mployer conducte d the poll shortly before the 
t ermination of its contract with the Retail Clerks Internationa l 
As s ociation and after the Retail Clerks had demanded the commence-
ment of nego tiat ions. The employer claimed that the poll was 
nee ded since it had not iced a significant decline in the numbe r 
of check-off authori za tions and the fact that there had been 
substantial employee turnover. The union, of cours e , filed charges. 
The Board pursued the charges. The case went all the way to the · 
7th Circuit. In NLRB v. H. P. Wasson & Co., 73 LRRM 24.48. (1970), 
the 7th Circuit revers e d the Board's decision and held that it was 
not warranted in finding violations of Section 8(a) (1) or (5) 
since all of the requiste requirements mere met. ~n 
In orde r to safeguard himself, the employer must have 
some reasonab le bas is for conducting the poll. Presumably, if 
the employer intends to conduct the poll anyway, he should be 
able to engender some objective manifestation of employee dis-
satisfaction. If he cannot, he shouldn't conduct the poll in 
the first place since this is a logical give awa y that he would 
lose. 
The second practical requirement is that the employer 
do everything within his power proceeding the election to assure 
that the outcome will be correct without giving notice to the 
union of its intent to poll the employees. Essentially, this 
prac tical requirement is no different than that involved in 
a pre-e lection camp a ign except tha t no mention of an upcoming 
poll can be made. 
The third practical requirement is that the employer 
choose the appropriate time and place for the conduct of the poll. 
Obviously, the day after payday, the da y afte r a wage increase, 
th e day afte r a long va cation or s ome other similarly aus~icious 
moment woul d logically be cho sen. Within limits, the emp loyer may 
chose to meet the employees on or off compa ny property, alon e or 
in a group and at the place of t he e mploye r's chasing. 
The fourth ~ractical requirement is that the employe r 
make e very e ffort to insure that th e employees are told that t he 
purpose of the poll is to determine employee sentiment and to 
give the app r opriate safeguard state ments. While this may seem 
burde nsome it really isn't. It is doubtful that the assurance s 
have much ef fect a nd even if they do, the employer cannot discharge 
or discriminate against an employee based on union support anyway. 
The fifth practical application is that the employer 
sha de the que s tion so as to produce the hoped-for results. The re 
are , of cour se , literally thousa nds of books a bout polling and how 
i t works. It would behoove an emp loyer to study these carefully 
There are certain decisions such as Shaeffer Pen Co., 459 F.2d 80 (C.A . 8, 
1973) which go so far as to allow pre-hire interviewsTn which one question is 
whether potential new hires will cross a picket line. Naturally, guarantees 
against reprisals must be given in such cases. You have already been made aware 
of your rights to inquire about strike intentions in health care facilities. 
Preterm, Inc., 240 NLRB No. 81, 100 LRRM 1345 (1979). 
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and even perhaps to hire an independent agency. My wife informs 
me that in her study of marketing in a business context, it is 
possible by selecting the right question and asking it at the 
right time to prove almost anything. 
A sixth practical c ondition should be pointed out. 
There is no back pay liability or other contractual obligation 
which could cloud taking the matter through the Bo ard and to 
the circuit court of appeals. Even though the Board could be 
assume d to oppose the employer throughout the whole process, 
the employer would not have the meter ticking while he defended 
his actions. Further,during the three or so years until final 
resolution by the court of appeals, the employer could solidify 
his position by announcing clearly and unequivocally to the employees 
that h e nceforth he is ac t ing on their behalf in refusing to bargain 
with the union. Insofar as obtaining employee support is 
concerned, this is a much better positjon to be in than mere ly 
refusing to b arga in with t he union or engaging in a long-term 
process to impasse. While the employees may get the me ssage 
more forcefully if the employer goes the impa sse route, the 
employer is still subject to the possibility that the employees 
will seek to rec t ify the proble m by bringing in a n e ven stronger 
union. Howeve r, if the employe r i s s ophist icated, he will make 
use of the inte rim period af ter a polling to prove to the employees 
that he is acting in thei r best interest and that he can be depended 
upon to "do right naturally." 
CONCLUSION 
In the above, there has be en an attempt to weig h a 
numb e r of the advantages and disadvantage s of using a Struksnes 
poll. It is quite frankly, a remarkably versatile tool if the 
employer use s it correctly. It is true that the emplcyer must 
agre e in effe ct to abide by the results. But he gains an enormous 
amount as a r esult of this relativeli small concession. He gains 
the ri ght to control the timing. He obtains valuable information 
as to the intensity o f the union support and the areas where that 
support i s congregated. He gains considerable a~ounts of infor-
mation as to the poss i b i lity of a s t rike being e ffectively carri e d 
off. He places himself in the publicly defensable position, if 
he wins the poll, of acting in the employees' best interest. 
The use of thi s poll, particularly in the situation 
where long-term e s tablished bargaining relationship exists, could 
be a major add i tion to our repertoire of techniques. If the 
employer loses the poll, he may always go back to the bargaining 
table while s e ttling the B(a) (1) charge. In effect, he is no worse 
off than he was before but he has obtained significant insight 
into the like l ihood of a successful strike being carried out. 
On the other ha nd, if he wins the poll, he may refuse to bargain 
and litigate the matter all the way to the circuit court on behalf 
: ·, 
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of the employees with no back pay running and wi th the assurance 
that even if he ultima tely loses at the circuit court, he will 
have convincingly d emonstrated to the employees that he was right 
in r e fusing to barga i n. In e ffect, he will have ga ine d mo s t of 
the advantage s of the i mpas se route with relatively few of the 
problems a ssociated with it. 
Warren C. Ogden, Jr. 
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